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According to common sense, things one has done are remembered better than things
done by others that one has observed. On first sight, findings concerning memory for
actions appear in line with that preconception: Performed actions (“subject-performed
tasks”) appear to be remembered particularly well, and better than observed actions
(“experimenter-performed tasks”). A closer look, however, reveals important exceptions
regarding this enactment effect. The aim of the present paper is critically evaluating
the literature that compares memory for performed and observed tasks. In recognition
memory, an enactment effect has regularly been observed. In free recall, however,
findings depended on the experimental design: When performed and observed actions
were intermixed, an enactment effect was typically found. In contrast, in designs where
actions were either all performed or all observed, this was rarely the case. We discuss
underlying memory processes, potential moderator variables, open questions, and
implications.
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I hear and I forget.
I see and I remember.
I do and I understand.
Confucius, ca. 500 b.c.
The aphorism by Confucius, though quite dated, captures what is still widely believed on how
to best learn and memorize novel actions and activities: “Learning by doing” appears superior
to “learning by viewing” (and verbal learning only appears worst). This assumption is applied
to a wide variety of contexts, from instructional design to navigation (e.g., von Stülpnagel and
Steffens, 2012, 2013). For example, a frequently provided illustration may read: “I need to drive
to remember a route. I will remember nothing as a passenger.” Similarly, “hands-on” learning in
instructional design andmulti-media learning is often propagated. This common-sense assumption
of superior learning after performing actions (i.e., enactment) as compared to other conditions has
been addressed in action memory research since the 1980’s and is reflected in the axiomatically
named “enactment effect.” There is much empirical evidence illustrating that as a rule enactment
encoding indeed leads to better memory for simple actions as compared to verbal learning (see
Engelkamp, 1998). The gist of research on action memory has been summarized by the statement:
“the basic finding in this field is that recall of enacted action phrases is superior to recall of action
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phrases without enactment” (Engelkamp and Cohen, 1991,
p.175). As implied, enactment encoding may also lead to
superior memory as compared to observation learning, that is,
learning by observing someone else enact (e.g., Golly-Häring and
Engelkamp, 2003; Hornstein and Mulligan, 2004). Arguably, the
citation from 1991, even if much younger than that by Confucius
above, is also somewhat dated. To illustrate our proposal that
researchers in the field are still positive that an enactment
effect should emerge if experiments are not methodologically
flawed, we compiled Table 1. We present anonymous reviewers’
comments as reactions to recent reports of experiments from
our lab that did not yield better recall after enactment than
observation. Notably, it was not our main aim to publish a
null effect, but to extend research to novel types of materials,
namely action sequences (see Schult et al., 2014). Next to
many very helpful comments that improved the presentation
of our research, reviewers were much concerned about an
action memory report that does not find an enactment effect.
As the first three comments in Table 1 illustrate, the postulate
of an enactment effect has thus assumed somewhat axiomatic
proportions. Importantly, the comments illustrate the suggestion
that research practices should be adapted until one finds what
one believed to be true in the first place (see Comments 2–
3). In conjunction with the widely accepted superiority of
enactment encoding, presumably this has led to an emphasis
on experimental conditions where enactment encoding leads to
superior memory than observation encoding. This is reflected
in the solutions shown further below in Table 1 (Comments
4–6) that were suggested by the reviewers in order to avoid
or sidestep the “problematic” null effect. To put it bluntly: In
order to demonstrate an enactment effect, suggestions made by
some reviewers included dropping (or at least altering) our initial
research question, or massively gearing our methodology and
stimuli toward an enactment effect. Only after forcing some kind
of enactment effect by all means, we would be qualified to discuss
its limitations. However, this approach may put the cart before
the horse.
Taken together, there is a widespread belief both in society
in general and in the scientific community that “learning by
doing” is inherently advantageous compared to all other study
conditions including “learning by viewing.” However, as we
review below, findings concerning the comparison of enactment
and observation encoding are rather ambiguous, and whether
an enactment effect is observed or not depends on factors
such as study design and memory task. After conducting
more than a dozen experiments with different stimuli and
study conceptualizations, we are confident to claim that a
memory advantage of enactment encoding over observation
encoding does not generally exist (i.e., independent of study
and testing conditions). An enactment effect over observation
may emerge, for example, if recognition tasks are used (rather
than recall tasks), or by using a within-list (rather than a pure-
list) manipulation of study conditions, as we will elaborate
below. However, we want to take up the cudgel on behalf
of the argument that recall differences between enactment
encoding and observation encoding represent—contrary to what
is frequently assumed—the exception rather than the rule. The
review at hand provides a summary of respective investigations
and a theoretical perspective that tries to explain (most of) the
existing findings, in addition to suggesting new studies.
MEMORY FOR ACTIONS
The paradigm typically used in action memory research involves
presenting simple action phrases such as “comb your hair” for
a later memory test. In the enactment condition, participants
perform an appropriate action for each phrase themselves. A
verbal learning condition has most frequently been used as a
control condition (for a comprehensive review, see Engelkamp,
1998), but this has several disadvantages. First, left to their own
devices, it is an open question which mnemonic strategies, if
any, participants use. Second, given more naturalistic action
sequences (e.g., to fold a paper frog), it is difficult to capture
verbally what exactly should be done in each action step.
Most importantly, an observation learning condition appears
the closest and therefore most adequate control condition:
Everything is held constant but motor performance. For example,
one participant (or alternatively the experimenter) may perform
the actions, while another participant observes him or her. This
allows researchers to pin down the mnemonic consequences of
enactment in the absence of any confounding factors.
By performing actions participants are forced to process task-
relevant features of action phrases. In line with this idea, it has
been found that enactment improves item-specific processing of
a phrase’s verb and object as well as the verb-object relation (e.g.,
Knopf, 1995; Kormi-Nouri, 1995; Engelkamp, 1998; Steffens,
1999; von Essen, 2005; Steffens et al., 2006, 2009). It appears that
people in the enactment condition focus on the details of what
they are doing, and this improves memory for what they have
done (i.e., the action verb) with which object (i.e., the action
object); this is referred to as item-specific processing.
Recognition
During recognition, participants are given the verbs, the
objects, or the action phrases they have learned, among
distractors, and are asked to indicate which ones were presented
during study. Recognition tests are particularly sensitive to
item-specific information. Indeed, when using these tests, a
clear-cut enactment effect compared to observation has been
reported (Engelkamp and Krumnacker, 1980; Koriat et al., 1991;
Engelkamp and Dehn, 2000; Golly-Häring and Engelkamp, 2003;
Mulligan and Hornstein, 2003; Hornstein and Mulligan, 2004;
Manzi and Nigro, 2008). In other words, the recognition of
phrases such as “light the match,” as well as the recognition of
the object (“match”) and the verb (“light”), is improved if they
have been enacted rather than observed during study1.
Free Recall
During free recall, participants are asked to list as many of the
action phrases they have learned before as possible, either on
1Whereas several studies comparing enactment with verbal learning have used
cued-recall tests to investigate verb-object integration (e.g., Bäckman and Nilsson,
1991; Kormi-Nouri, 1995), there is a lack of research comparing cued recall after
enactment and observation (for an exception, see Feyereisen, 2009).
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TABLE 1 | Anonymous reviewers’ comments regarding experiments that yielded similar free recall performance in an enactment and in an observation
condition.
1. “It seems odd to me that in a three-experiment report on the enactment effect there is not a single enactment effect demonstrated [...].”
2. “When the authors failed to get the basic [enactment] effect, they should have gone fully after it [...].”
3. “From my perspective it’s critical to establish that the materials, as constructed, are sensitive enough to elicit any kind of enactment effect [...].”
4. “[...] the authors should have placed their initial hypothesis on hold and have gone after the null enactment effect [...].”
5. “If recognition test is more sensitive to pick up the differences, then I suggest they [i.e., the authors] exploit that test to a greater extent, rather than rely on the null
effects in free recall [...].”
6. “ I’m particularly sensitive to this issue because I, too, have been in the position of developing my own novel enactment stimuli, which, at first, weren’t yielding a
significant effect. I had to tinker with them until they did, and only then was it appropriate that I explore more specific questions with my materials.”
a blank sheet of paper, or verbally, or they are asked to enact
them (i.e., performance-based recall). Findings regarding the
enactment effect are less clear for free recall. Arguably, being able
to recall actions is often more important than only recognizing
them when presented. After all, one aim of learning actions
is to be able to carry them out at a later point in time (i.e.,
performance-based free recall). Free recall has been considered to
be a function of relational processing in addition to item-specific
processing (e.g., Hunt and Einstein, 1981; Hunt and McDaniel,
1993; McDaniel and Bugg, 2008). Relational processing is defined
as processing the relations among to-be-learned action phrases,
thus providing retrieval routes that can be used for generating
the next action if one action has been remembered. For example,
relational information can be based on similarities between
actions or on the order in which they were presented. During
free recall, better processing of item-specific information may
compensate poorer processing of relational information, and
vice versa, and this trade-off may result in comparable net
recall across different study conditions. Although enactment
improves item-specific processing, it does not generally enhance
relational processing. Particularly, enactment does not enhance
relational processing if relations among action phrases do not
become salient during enactment (Steffens, 1999). For instance,
enactment has not been found to improve clustering based on
taxonomic classifications (e.g., gardening activities), but it does
increase clustering based on movement-based similarities (e.g.,
twisting; Koriat and Pearlman-Avnion, 2003). These findings
indicate that the type of relations that exist among to-be-learned
action phrases moderates findings. Enactment may even hinder
the processing of order information, so that after enactment,
participants are less able to indicate which action was first in a list,
which was second, and so forth (e.g., Engelkamp and Dehn, 2000;
also see Olofsson, 1996). In contrast, observing someone enact
enhances relational processing more than enactment does, which
may result in equal free recall for short lists of unrelated actions
(Engelkamp and Dehn, 2000). As the latter finding implies,
list length needs to be taken into account when evaluating
findings.
Within-List Designs
When predicting free recall performance after enactment vs.
observation, the experimental design needs to be taken into
account (Engelkamp and Zimmer, 1997; Engelkamp and Dehn,
2000; Golly-Häring and Engelkamp, 2003). Whereas in a
pure-list design participants either enact or observe all action
phrases of one list, they switch between these encoding tasks
in within-list designs, for example, enacting the first action,
observing the second, and so on. Within-list designs have
been found to elicit a robust enactment effect in free recall
(e.g., Zimmer and Engelkamp, 1984; Dick and Kean, 1989;
Engelkamp and Zimmer, 1997; Engelkamp and Dehn, 2000;
Golly-Häring and Engelkamp, 2003; Zalla et al., 2010). One
possible explanation for this is the disrupting of relational
processing during observation through the intervening actions.
If good free recall after observation particularly depends on
relational processing, and this relational processing is disturbed
by intervening actions, then free recall performance deteriorates
for observed actions. A second reason for bad recall performance
for observed actions intermixed with enacted actions could
be selectively displaced rehearsal (see Slamecka and Katsaiti,
1987): Possibly, actions carried out appear more important
than those observed, so that relatively more attention is
devoted to actions when interspersed with observed phrases (for
evidence related to importance, see Schult and Steffens, 2011,
2013).
Free Recall After Enactment vs.
Observation in Pure-List Designs
A pure-list design in which participants learn all action phrases
either by enactment or by observation may be a purer test
to investigate the contributions of item-specific and relational
information to free recall: In within-list designs, participants
need to switch between tasks, and task-switching provokes
cognitive costs (e.g., Meiran et al., 2000). Also, a signal is needed
which task to carry out (“enact,” “observe”) that may interfere
with memory encoding. Arguably, learning something either by
enactment or by observation is also highly relevant in applied
contexts. For example, one may give someone else detailed
instructions on how tomake pancakes (enactment: “now crack an
egg and add it”). Alternatively, one may watch a video instruction
on how to accomplish a task (observation: “now I crack an
egg and add it”). We are not implying that taking turns is not
relevant in applied contexts (e.g., someone may enact the easier
action steps and observe the more complicated ones); instead, we
believe that learning either by enactment or by observation is also
frequent.
Findings in pure-list designs are mixed. Table 2 summarizes
the total of 36 experiments that contrasted free recall of healthy
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adults after enactment and observation in pure-list designs2. As
can be seen, superior recall after enactment than observation
is rather the exception than the rule. Only seven experiments
reported an enactment effect over observation. As indicated
above, internal list structure and list length need to be considered
when evaluating findings. In Table 2 we additionally included
information about object presentation during the study phase
and about study-test cycles as further possible moderating
variables. Two experiments that manipulated object presentation
(object present vs. imagined) within a list showed comparable
recall improvement after object presentation by enactment
and observation (Engelkamp and Zimmer, 1983, 1997). Thus,
whether participants use real objects during the study phase or
enact phrases symbolically, pretending to use an object, appears
not to affect recall performance differentially for both encoding
tasks. Similarly, comparable effects have been obtained whether
verbal or performance-based free recall is used (i.e., reporting
actions verbally during the memory test or performing actions
again, e.g., Steffens, 2007).
Number of Study-Test Cycles
Five experiments that used four or more study-test trials reported
an enactment effect aggregated across trials. Each study phase
was followed by a recall test, another study-test cycle, and
so on. One may assume that enactment of single actions is
an unusual encoding task (McDaniel and Bugg, 2008)—people
do not routinely perform lists of unrelated actions (let alone
pantomimically). It is thus possible that an enactment effect
emerges in later test trials when participants have become
familiar with enactment-task requirements. It appears that the
available evidence provides some support for this idea (but see
below).
List Structure
Another potential moderator is the internal list structure; in
other words, whether relations among list elements are given. For
example, the objects of several action phrases could be related
to each other (e.g., animals, fruit, etc.). Alternatively, there could
be no internal list structure (i.e., unrelated lists). We first turn to
the evidence on the list-length hypothesis for unrelated lists and
then look at the two kinds of internal list structure that have been
investigated: object relations and action sequences.
List Length
Only three out of 23 experiments presenting unrelated lists
demonstrated better free recall after enactment than observation.
These three experiments used rather long lists containing 24 or 48
action phrases. Indeed, list length has been discussed as a factor
moderating the enactment effect (Engelkamp, 1998; Engelkamp
and Dehn, 2000). Those authors argued that in lists in which
no categorical-relational information is offered, participants
in the observation condition spontaneously use serial order
information at recall, whereas participants in the enactment
condition use item-specific information. Better processing of
2We refrained from a statistical meta-analysis of the findings because the necessary
information (e.g., SDs, exact statistics for each condition) is missing in many cases,
particularly in the case of null findings.
order-relational information after observation may compensate
for poorer item-specific processing, leading to comparable net
recall; however, as was argued further, with increasing list length,
order information becomes less efficient as a retrieval route.
Consequently, an enactment effect over observation was expected
if a sufficiently long list of (20 or more) unrelated actions was
learned (Golly-Häring and Engelkamp, 2003). In line with a
list-length hypothesis for unrelated lists all nine observation-
enactment comparisons in Table 2 that used short lists of fewer
than 20 actions reported comparable free recall performance.
Fourteen experiments used long lists with 20 or more actions.
Contradicting the list-length hypothesis, 11 of them reported
no enactment effect. A closer inspection of Table 2 suggests
that an enactment effect as compared to observation could be
more likely for very long lists. Several of the comparisons using
lists of 48 actions reported the enactment effect; yet only one
out of seven experiments using medium list lengths of 20–
24 actions did. Thus, enactment could be advantageous for
recalling very long lists of action phrases if no salient relations
between action phrases are provided. However, given the number
of experiments using such long lists that did not yield an
enactment effect, the list-length hypothesis should be regarded
with caution. It appears safe to conclude that for lists with up
to 24 unrelated actions enactment and observation are similarly
effective encoding conditions.
Object-Related Actions
In contrast to the small number of enactment effects observed
in lists of unrelated actions, all four experiments that presented
lists of actions related by object categories demonstrated an
enactment effect. Golly-Häring and Engelkamp (2003) presented
lists based on the categories of objects involved in the action
(e.g., tools or animals). The authors assumed that relational
information based on object similarities is equally available
after enactment and observation because categorical-relational
information is well-established in long-term memory and
spontaneously activated when object exemplars are encountered.
To the degree that categorical information is efficiently processed
in both encoding tasks, the superior item-specific memory after
enactment should lead to an enactment effect in free recall. In
line with this reasoning, those authors found an enactment effect
across four experiments in free recall when exemplars of different
categories were presented in a random order or when all actions
belonged to the same category. They also reported comparable
clustering according to object category for both encoding tasks.
Action Sequences
However, it should be noted that only a small number of
experiments compared enactment and observation using lists of
related actions, and relations were restricted to object similarities.
An entirely different type of relational information is that
present in action sequences such as “making clay” or “building
a bird feeder” (e.g., Steffens, 2007). Arguably, learning such
a sequence is more common in everyday life than learning
unrelated or object-related lists of actions. Moreover, relational
information is more diverse and thus less obvious in action
sequences than in artificial lists of actions as described above that
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TABLE 2 | Experiments comparing free recall after Enactment (E) and Observation (O) in pure-list designs.
Number Source Exp. Number Direction and
size of effect (d)
List length Internal list structure Objects during
study phase
No. of study-test
cycles
1 Cohen, 1981 1 E = O 15 Unrelated Real 2
2 Cohen, 1983 1 E = O 21 Unrelated Real 2
3 Cohen and Bean, 1983 - E = O 12 Unrelated Real 5
4 Cohen et al., 1987 1 E = O 24 Unrelated Real 1
5 2 E = O 20 Unrelated Real 1
6 4 E = O 18 Unrelated Real 1
7 5 E = O 23 Unrelated Real 1
8 Engelkamp and Dehn,
2000
1 E = O 8 Unrelated None 8
9 2 E = O 8 Unrelated None 8
10 4 E > O 24 Unrelated None 4
11 5 E = O 24 Unrelated None 4
12 Engelkamp et al., 2003 1 E = O 8 Unrelated None 8
13 2 E = O 8 Unrelated None 8
14 3 E = O 8 Unrelated None 8
15 Engelkamp and
Krumnacker, 1980
– E = O 48 Unrelated None 2a
16 Engelkamp and
Zimmer, 1983
– E > O (1.19) 48 Unrelated Real vs. none 1
17 Engelkamp and
Zimmer, 1997
2 E = O 18 Unrelated Real vs. none 1
18 3 E > O (1.01) 48 Unrelated Real vs. none 1
19 Golly-Häring and
Engelkamp, 2003
1 E > O (0.83) 24 Object-category None 4
20 2 E > O 12 Object-category None 6
21 3 E > O 8 Object-category None 8
22 4 E > O (1.02) 6 Object-category None 8
23 Nadar and McDowd,
2008
– E = O 20 Unrelated Real 1b
24 Schult et al., 2014 1a E = O (u) 24 Unrelated vs. sequence None 4
E < O (0.34, s)
25 2 E = O 60 Unrelated vs. sequence None 1
26 Steffens, 2007 1 E = O 25 Sequence Real 1
27 2 E = O 68 Sequence Real 1
28 von Stülpnagel et al.,
2015b
1 E = O 25, 14 Sequence Real 2c
29 2 E = O 25, 14 Sequence Real 2
30 3 E = O 25, 14 Sequence Real 2
31 4 E = O 25, 14 Sequence Real 2
32 Online Appendix 5 E < O (0.38)d 25, 14 Sequence Real 2
33 von Stülpnagel et al.,
in press
1 E = Oe 9–30 Sequence Real 5
34 2 E = Of 9–30 Sequence Real 5
UNPUBLISHED EXPERIMENTS
35 Schult et al., 2015a 1 E = O 60 Unrelated None 1
36 von Stülpnagel et al.,
2015a
1 E = O 48 Unrelated vs. sequence None 1
37 Schult et al., 2015b 1 E = O 46, 47 Sequence Real 2
38 2 E = O 46, 47 Sequence Real 2
aRecall was assessed after a study, a recognition, and again a study phase.
bEach participant took part in different experimental conditions (within subject), but there was only one cycle for each task (e.g., enactment).
cGiven there was a practice cycle, one could also argue there were 3 cycles, but only 2 were evaluated.
dThere was an interaction: A negative enactment effect was obtained for one of the sequences (i.e., one study-test cycle).
eAn enactment effect was found for the longest of the five sequences (assembling a Lego model) that was not replicated in the subsequent experiment.
fPictorial learning outperformed both enactment and observation for one of the five sequences (creating a computer graph), which was totally unexpected and not found in Experiment 1.
Statistically significant enactment effects are printed in bold.
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comprised only relations well-established in long-term memory.
In order to learn a new sequence of action steps that are
basically known, a sequence of actions needs to be remembered
that comprises different (typically unrelated) objects, some of
them repeated; it comprises “in-order-to relations” and “enable
relations” (Lichtenstein and Brewer, 1980); it comprises steps that
may appear totally unrelated unless in this specific sequence that
is to be learned. For example, unless you repair a bike’s flat tire,
“tube,” and “water” may be quite unrelated objects; and in order
to make pancakes, some steps have to be finished before others
can be begun, whereas other orders are loose. Possibly, you use
silverware several times when making pancakes, with different
actions (i.e., verbs). Therefore, given this variety of relations
that need to be processed, it is possible that learning such
sequences of actions does not profit from enactment as compared
to observation as much as learning simplified lists based on
transparent object categories. Indeed, as Table 2 shows, none of
the 14 experiments that compared action sequence learning by
enactment and observation found an overall enactment effect
in free recall (11 of them are published, three are unpublished
experiments from our lab). Two out of the 14 experiments instead
yielded better free recall after observation than enactment. In
other words, people who had observed someone perform a
new sequence of actions were better able to reproduce that
sequence of steps than those who had performed the task
themselves. Whereas an enactment effect was found for one
out of five sequences in one of the 14 experiments, this finding
was not replicated in the follow-up experiment that used the
same materials. In that follow-up experiment, instead, pictorial
learning, involving neither performing nor observing actions,
was superior to enactment and observation for another of
the five sequences (von Stülpnagel et al., in press). During
pictorial learning, participants saw the same illustrated stepwise
instructions as did participants in the enactment condition. The
evidence thus appears quite clear that learning novel sequences
of actions in order to perform them later does not profit from
enactment compared to observation.
Relational Processing in Action Sequences
As reviewed above, free recall is assumed to be based on
both item-specific and relational information. Thus, similar
performance after enactment and observation may result from
a trade-off: superior item-specific processing in the enactment
condition (see recognition findings), but superior processing of
novel relations in the observation condition (e.g., Engelkamp
and Dehn, 2000). For action sequences, there is some evidence
of superior item-specific processing in the enactment than
observation condition (e.g., an enactment effect in recognition
memory: Schult et al., 2014, Experiment 1b). Some evidence of
superior relational processing in the observation as compared
to the enactment condition has also been published (Steffens,
2007; Schult et al., 2014). However, in addition to those four
published experiments from our lab, four additional, unpublished
experiments, using materials and procedures very similar to
the published ones, did not yield any hints that relational
processing is better after observation than enactment (e.g.,
ordered recall, clustering, and input-output correspondence after
both encoding conditions were comparable). At the same time,
those experiments also yielded comparable free recall after
observation and enactment. Two of those experiments (Schult
et al., 2015a; von Stülpnagel et al., 2015a) were from the same
set of experiments as the published ones (Schult et al., 2014),
but had been suggested to be cut from the paper by reviewers
because of the null findings. Two additional experiments tested
whether participants in the observation condition understand
more quickly than those in the enactment condition what the
topic of the action sequence is (Schult et al., 2015b; see Discussion
section for details). Memory organization was comparable in
both encoding conditions. Taken together, we conclude that the
evidence is mixed concerning the question whether observation
leads to better organization of action sequences than enactment,
or whether some as yet unknown factor contributes to the
comparably good recall performance after observation.
DISCUSSION
Enactment as compared to observation improves recognizing
actions. As a rule, enactment also leads to superior free
recall when compared to observation if enacted and observed
actions are intermixed. However, in a pure-list design (i.e.,
some participants enact all actions, others observe all actions),
enactment and observation have yielded similar memory
performance in the majority of the experiments that we are
aware of. An enactment effect appears somewhat more likely
first, if there are several study-test cycles and second, if very long
lists of unrelated actions have to be recalled. Third, if salient
relations among action phrases are given, based on objects,
an enactment effect is more likely to emerge. However, this is
not the case if the actions are embedded in sequences such
as “folding a paper frog” or “tying a knot,” where no single
experiment has yielded better verbal free recall or performance-
based free recall after enactment than observation. Arguably,
findings for such sequences have more important implications
for everyday learning than findings with artificial lists based on
object similarity.
How can we explain this pattern of findings? In line with
the theoretical introduction of this paper, enactment appears to
improve item-specific processing of each action phrase: People
appear to focus on the details of what they are doing, and
this improves recognition memory for each single action, on
average. As compared to recognition, free recall is a more
difficult task, requiring retrieval routes. Whereas there is some
evidence that spontaneous “pop-out into memory” is improved
by enactment (Zimmer et al., 2000), there is little evidence that
retrieval is generally better after enactment than observation.
On the contrary, observation appears to often enhance memory
organization of action sequences as compared to enactment.
Note, however, that the evidence is inconsistent if unpublished
experiments on action sequences are taken into account.
If participants in an observation condition focus less on the
details of each action than those in the enactment condition,
they could become aware of the goals of a sequence of actions
earlier (i.e., of the “big picture”). In two experiments, we
specifically tested this idea (Schult et al., 2015b). For example, all
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participants went through the steps of crafting a ghost puppet,
either performing the steps or observing them. Several times
they were interrupted, and we used explicit as well as implicit
tests of their awareness (e.g., a word completion task including
word fragments such as “gh”). No evidence was obtained that
participants in the observation condition understood more
quickly what the task was about than those in the enactment
condition. Whereas a null finding is always ambiguous, this
indicates at least that more sensitive tests are needed to find
differences in the awareness of action sequence goals between
enactment and observation. Taken together, some, but not all
evidence supports the view that observation leads to superior
memory organization than enactment.
One theoretical reason why an enactment effect may emerge
is that enactment encoding provides additional memory markers
as compared to observation and verbal encoding (Engelkamp,
1998). In spite of the fact that several studies presented
convincing evidence that motor information is not the source
of the enactment effect (e.g., Helstrup, 2005), it could be argued
that the multi-modal encoding during enactment establishes
deeper memory traces, which benefits long-term retrieval
performance. The paradigm applied in action memory research
normally evaluates memory performance within minutes after
the study phase3. Testing the effects of longer retrieval intervals
on memory performance after enactment and observation,
especially regarding item-specific and relational encoding
strategies, appears to be a worthwhile research topic. However, it
is also possible that such deep memory traces are automatically
established during observation as well (e.g., Rizzolatti, 2005;
Iacoboni, 2005). For example, an experiment on directed
forgetting demonstrated that neither young nor old participants
were able to intentionally forget actions that had been carried out,
as compared to those learned verbally (Earles and Kersten, 2002).
This finding supports the idea that enactment encoding provides
additional memorymarkers. But as no observation condition was
included in that study, it is an open question whether observation
would have left comparably robust memory traces.
Also, it is surprising that experiments comparing cued recall
after enactment and observation are scarce (for an exception, see
Feyereisen, 2009). Such research should be done to test whether
the integration between the verb and object of an action phrase
profits from observation as much as from enactment. However,
it should be noted that given performance-based recall of action
sequences, the distinction between free recall and cued recall is
blurred: If objects are present that need to be used during action
execution (e.g., “now, make pancakes again”), one could argue
that the test is an object-based cued recall of the action sequence,
rather than a free recall. The respective studies found similar
performance after an enactment and an observation condition.
Thus, it is likely that cued recall is similar after enactment and
observation learning.
Studies on action memory frequently impose strict time limits
for studying and retrieval. A recent study suggests that recall
3Several experiments investigated delayed recall, but did not include an
observation condition (Knopf and Neidhardt, 1989; Nilsson et al., 1989; Kubik
et al., 2014b).
differences between enactment encoding and verbal encoding
increase with expanding recall time (Spranger et al., 2008; also
see Kubik et al., 2014a). Again, an observation condition was not
included and should be in future research. In other words, we
cannot exclude the possibility that enactment would yield better
recall than observation if participants were givenmore time (than
a few minutes) to retrieve all the actions they remembered.
What else differs between the enactment and the observation
condition? Enactment is an unfamiliar task (McDaniel and
Bugg, 2008) that may draw attention away from memorizing
retrieval routes. At the same time, being able to perform all
the required actions may suggest to participants that they could
easily do it again—after all, they have already succeeded once.
For instance, it was recently demonstrated that participants
during enactment encoding, as compared to observation and
other study conditions, thought the memory task was very easy,
and they were afterwards surprised about their bad memory
performance (von Stülpnagel et al., 2015b). Possibly, if the study
and recall phases were extended, the disadvantages of such
a novel task would fade, and participants would profit more
from good item-specific encoding after enactment. Enactment
effects obtained with several study-test cycles could hint into
this direction (see Table 2). However, Kubik and colleagues
recently demonstrated that enactment effects, as compared to
verbal learning, disappeared in later study-test cycles (Kubik
et al., 2014a). These findings speak against the idea that
participants may profit more from good item-specific encoding
after enactment in later study-test cycles.
Another theoretical idea has also missed empirical support
up to now. We reasoned that, if observation draws attention
to the overall sequence structure, but enactment helps to learn
the details (i.e., item-specific processing), then the optimal
combination of encoding conditions would be to first observe,
then enact the same sequence. Thus, observation would
provide the “big picture,” and enactment would help to learn
the details. However, as compared to enacting the sequence
twice, both enactment-then-observation and observation-then-
enactment yielded worse recall (Gottschlich, 2013). Observing
the sequence twice yielded intermediate recall performance
that was not significantly different from performance after
enacting the sequence twice. That experiment used the “backpack
packing” sequence described by Steffens (2007, Experiment 1).
Thus, findings rather suggest that consistently learning a novel
action sequence by enactment or by observation is superior
to switching between study conditions. Possibly, the routine
obtained by repeating the same study condition, be it enactment
or observation, yields a memory advantage as compared to
familiarizing one-self with a different task on the second cycle.
The question remains why the belief in the enactment effect is
so robust despite contrasting evidence and convincing counter-
examples. We can think of two reasons. First, the enactment
of novel activities (i.e., “learning by doing”) in everyday life as
compared to the lab-based studies discussed in this manuscript
is often self-paced. To illustrate: A person building a bird feeder
according to a manual can study the instructions until sufficient
comprehension is accomplished. Execution can be as thorough
as desired. Corrections can be made. If, in contrast, the building
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of the bird feeder is demonstrated to a group by a skilled
instructor, these opportunities to regulate the encoding process
and thus one’s cognitive load are more limited. Additionally, the
overall time span available to encode the action steps is likely
to be shorter than during self-paced enactment. In other words,
lay people’s comparison of “learning by doing” and “learning
by viewing” may be frequently confounded by factors such as
exposition time and mental effort spent. Unfortunately, these
confounds are rather hard to overcome in lab studies: Self-paced
enactment encoding of one participant could be yoked to an
observing participant to control exposition time. However, it
appears likely that the extended observation of a person fiddling
around with study materials and correcting mistakes may lose
the observer’s attention rather quickly. A potential solution could
be to provide observing participants with the possibility to study
video instructions at their own pace. Nevertheless, differences in
self-regulated or other-regulated study time may be one source of
the belief in the enactment effect and thus worthwhile of future
investigation.
A second reason for the frequent assumption of the
superiority of “learning by doing” in everyday life may result
from a confound of enactment with generation. The generation
of results by cognitive operations has often been shown to benefit
memory performance (e.g., Crutcher and Healy, 1989; Steffens
and Erdfelder, 1998). Because the typical study materials in
action memory research are designed to be as simple, clear,
and unambiguous as possible, they hardly require a cognitively
demanding generation of the action. In contrast, many everyday
activities (i.e., cooking, handicraft work) allow some degrees of
freedom when enacted, but not when observed. This could be
experimentally accomplished by study materials without a strict
sequential order, where all action steps as well as the final state of
the activity need to be generated during the study phase (e.g., a
participant would receive the general instruction to build a Lego
house along with pictures of the finished house). Following this
line of thought, it would be a challenging task to separate the
cognitive costs of action planning and motor information during
the encoding of such action sequences (see Knopf et al., 2005, for
such an approach on memory for simple, unrelated actions).
In a nutshell, it appears that the net result—remembering
to perform a series of actions when required to do so—is
similar after learning by enactment and learning by observing
someone else enact. In free recall in pure-list designs, the most
likely outcome is a trade-off, with better item-specific processing
during enactment and somewhat better organization during
observation yielding similar recall.
Practically speaking, it appears that novel sequences consisting
of known action steps can be performed as well after observing
someone else as after performing them one-self. Even if new
motor sequences are acquired, performing is not always superior
to observing (Larssen et al., 2012). Only if the aim is recognizing
performed actions, enactment leads to better memory than
observation. And if some action steps are performed, but others
are observed, the observed ones tend to be more easily forgotten.
Of course, memory recall after observation should only be as
good as memory recall after enactment if all relevant information
becomes available in both conditions. For example, if teaching
someone a new computer program, the teacher has to make sure
that each mouse click and each shortcut used on the keyboard
is shown and/or told to the observer. This could be easier to
accomplish if the novice operates all devices, instead of the
teacher. Similarly, if passengers stop paying attention to the route,
it is of little surprise that they do not remember it afterwards.
Thus, one final reason why people believe in “learning by doing”
could be that information is regularly omitted or unattended
in “learning by viewing” or learning by instruction unless one
makes an effort to the contrary. If such an effort is made, as
in the experiments reviewed here, recall differences are often
negligible between an enactment and an observation learning
condition—in spite of lay people’s and experts’ convictions.
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